

Nine Voices Questions and Answers

MIRIAM BAJTALA


The point of departure for the work, *in my name*, is an assertion. I use the invitation card to visualize the gesture of appropriating space, making it seem as though the exhibition is in the Main Hall. Those who don't see the exhibition probably don't notice the pretense of a different reality. I'm interested in this playing with perception, with inclusions and exclusions. What do you, as an art critic, think about gestures of appropriation like this one?

GABRIELE MACKERT

First of all, I would ask myself what type of text you expect from me in your concept of delegated writing, speaking, questioning. Which of your approaches would be appropriate, and how it might remain in keeping with your concept? Does it mean that I should answer a question about details and not be allowed to contextualize the "whole" work? Lacan qualified language as the "discourse of the Other".* What the ego is looking for in the discourse is the "answer of the Other," and what the ego constitutes as the subject is the subject's question. This quote seems to me to be a fertile starting point both for writing about your work and as a description of the basic situation of writing as a writer/critic about art or an artist.

I would ask myself why you are interested above all in the perception of the invitation card. Probably because it correlates to the chronological logic of initially perceiving an exhibition by way of the invitation. Is it because, even years in the future, the invitation card will still represent the exhibition as a prominent relic? Regardless of how the flyer may look, shooting a film in the Main Room of the Secession and then showing it in the Grafisches Kabinett is entirely legitimate. The playing with and distortion of spaces is very vividly discussed in the work itself. Printing a photo of the Main Room as an invitation is consistent with the work's structure.

* Cf. Jacques Lacan, *Écrits I*, Paris, 1966, especially "Le discours de l'autre", pp. 235ff.



„It is very hard to 'explain oneself' ...
Most of the time, when someone asks me a question,
even one which relates to me, I see that, strictly,
I don't have anything to say.“

MIRIAM BAJTALA

How do you contextualise this approach?

GABRIELE MACKERT

I would think about the nature of your appropriation. Apparently you address authorship by playing with texts, linguistic atmospheres, roles, and spaces. You use the exhibition space as a workspace. Mutated into a backdrop, with all of its history and implications, it provides the best conditions to help make a statement about significance. With the medium of video you have chosen a documentary format that references the past and establishes the required level of reflection for the subject of appropriation.

MIRIAM BAJTALA


What inclusions and exclusions in the text are you concerned about? How do you appropriate "material"?

MIRIAM BAJTALA

I asked four people involved with art to each write an exhibition speech for me. The requirements for it were formally set down: the first-person form and the maximum length. Which of the speeches moved you and why?

SARAH KOLB

A good speech is characterised by originality and authenticity. When speaking in my own name, I prefer to speak naturally, not mincing my words, with the emphasis on naturally, rather than in a traditional, coincidental, or recognised style. A good speech is as simple as it is moving, as terse as it is astute, as effortless as it is convincing. It doesn't require any theoretical, scientific, or historicising justification; it is primarily sufficient in and of itself; but it can, of course, also successfully bear down onto or throw itself into any framework. But in any event, it draws from life, and even if it's only found between the lines, from the fullness of experience, of immediacy, from know-



ledge and expertise. It doesn't have anything stilted or forced, does not purport or boast. It is personal and evinces humor; need not be funny, never beats about the bush with its eventualities, its strengths, and weaknesses. And it leaves something open and either gives the listener time and space to get lost in it or offers free rein for his or her own associations. At this point I perhaps must admit to lacking a bit of distance. I value both you and your work very much.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

What do you find interesting about the speech's format? What differences would you highlight in comparing an exhibition address to a political speech?

JENS KASTNER

A speech is nothing without an auditorium. It must be heard, that's why it is delivered. And the speakers who wish to be heard must, to a certain extent, be selected, be authorised even before they begin to speak. There must be a structural setting, supported by an institutional framework that simultaneously turns

the listeners into validators of the authority (*What do you mean by appropriation?**). Thus the speech is always doubly exclusive. On the one hand, it denies unauthorised persons entry to approved utterances of content and expression and, on the other hand, excludes common speaking. In this sense, a grand speech is a pleonasm, because a speech is always extraordinary and ceremonial. This is its space of possibility, whether as an address for an exhibition opening or in political agitation on a soap box of the speaker's very own, or in the great space that is named after and for it: parliament.

However, there's a difference to be found here. Admittedly, the selected persons speak in both spaces—in art and in politics—but they speak primarily to their peers, a similarly select circle of experts and people who would like to be seen as experts, while in the other case there is at least the claim of speaking to everyone. That is why the field of vision in a political speech remains general, even when it speaks about something specific, such as funding for the arts. A speech in the field of art is tied to its particular history; it furthermore addresses—or tends to address—not so much a collective than an individual artist's characteristics (*that this is not about the "I"!***).

Speeches are representations: depictions, perceptions, stand-ins that are sized up and must be formally dispensed in order to claim and defend their validity. The identity of the people holding them, and how a person relates to them, is usually a forgone conclusion.

*From the (counter-) speech written by Miriam Bajtala.

**From the speech written for Miriam Bajtala by Carola Platzek.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

In your opinion, how does the content of the speech correspond to its intention in my work?

„The author creates a world, but there is no world which awaits us to be created. Neither identification nor distance, neither proximity nor remoteness, for, in all these cases, one is led to speak for, in the place of .. One must, on the contrary, speak with, write with. With the world, with a part of the world, with people. Not a talk at all, but a conspiracy, a collision of love or hatred. There is no judgement in sympathy, but agreements of convenience between bodies of all kinds.“

Good evening.

I was somewhat surprised at where the opportunity to write the speech on my exhibition led me: from harlequinesque projections to sheer fury, from self-doubt to the fierce determination to ignore almost all expectations, including my own. Except for the expectation that I would be surprising, or bold, as it is often called; but it's actually much simpler: I find my narcissism so entertaining that I don't have it under control, nor do I want to. And I should add that the revelation of this manifest self-affinity is every bit as refreshing to me as my song of self-praise itself.

I've thought about fetishism and am intrigued with the sheer number of different relationships this term can be invoked for, even within those of my works that are on show here. I'm saying all of this now—please don't interpret it as impolite—with sentences which I received as gifts. The names can be found in the inevitable footnotes, as in every undertaking that is still clear about its uncertainty. Nothing can better capture the almost compellingly heuristic character of this speech. Conceal? Never. Mitigate? Maybe.

Thus I say to you: fetishism is an expression of a corrupt object relationship. First appropriation.¹

And, since I don't wish to repeat the word “corrupt”, I will speak about these relationships. In this I find myself neither particularly neurotic nor at all contradictory.

However, I do not plan to categorise my own work, or even legitimise it, or offer to you a point-blank interpretive reading of it; in other words, I have no intention of taking away your ascriptions. I am not so altruistic, I am quite content to be forced to idly watch how you, in your unspoiled understanding of experience, make “me” your agent of your idea of provocation. Except that in doing so you forget “me” and decide for me what my conscious and unconscious intentions are, what my scope of action is, and what IN ME is assigned to your sphere. In the name of discursivisation. Because as readily as objects are “made subject” in the act of fetishisation, there is also an opposite tendency: I am constantly being degraded to an object, or else the objects I create are incessantly intermingled with my assumed “subject”. Last but not least, I, I as a synonym for the artist, am even blamed for evoking your displacements—which, since they're based on a concept of accommodation, are inevitably uninspired. This is really enough! I simply refuse to accept them. (That I'm using them yet again, or rather, not “I” but some sort of passive

construction of “me,” is a different kettle of fish.) Even if I were to lend out my “I,” surrender it, temporarily replace it, I simply wouldn’t be able to escape this logic. And what would be said thereby? That this is not about the “I,” as desirable as this idea might be for us? Essentially, we are reunited by this longing, or at least by the way we encounter it: sloppily and thoughtlessly. It’s no wonder that the “I” denies itself to us when we leave it like this to lay claim to uniqueness even in the acquiescence to the situation. No wonder. I will forgo the imposition of the next dispute about authorship. It’s all imposition enough already. Or rather, not IT, but our concepts. We are all prisoners in a certain way—a platitude in the text is always satisfying—a network of self-promises and self-legitimations, an ongoing fetishism; apologists of the nineteenth century. Now I’m getting hysterical. But that too is actually a necessary and connected element.

And now that we’ve arrived at psychoanalysis, I have one last thing to say: the pattern is never repetition in and of itself, that’s much too simple-minded; the horror of repetition is in the trauma of interpretation. Second and third appropriation:²

And you? You’ll do with this speech what I want you to do with it, namely, whatever you please.³

- 1 See Hartmut Böhme, “Fetischismus im 19. Jahrhundert. Wissenschaftshistorische Analysen zur Karriere eines Konzepts”, in: Jürgen Barkhoff, Gilbert Carr, Roger Paulin (eds.), *Das schwierige neunzehnte Jahrhundert*, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 2000, pp. 445–467.
- 2 Adapted from Barbara Johnson. Thanks to Johannes Porsch, who introduced me to this text in the first place.
- 3 Marguerite Duras, *Green Eyes* [Reflections on Film], Columbia University Press, New York, 1990.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

How do you deal with spoken and written language in the format of a speech?

ANDREAS SPIEGL

The attempt to speak as if one were writing, and to write as if one were speaking, registers the desire to allow both to merge into each other, to blend them in order to discard them. It is no longer speech, no longer writing, not the sum of both and certainly not a whole. What is vocalised in it, what comes up in this blend, is an interference, a disturbance, an unsettled signification, if you will: a language that refuses to produce meaning that would be independent of itself. The meaning seems disrupted when language interferes, when language relates more than it brings to mind, when it deceives about the meaning, when it speaks of the unspeakable, when it indicates where it misses the meaning, where it omits, refuses, withholds the statement. It drains the meaning almost senselessly, brings its downfall, refuses, closes itself off from the attempt to formulate a thought out of fear of finalising thought with it, to promise that there is a goal, a product, an answer to everything. Speech and counter-speech, writing

and its written riposte, act as if they had a common concern, as if they were merely separated by an inconsistency that had to be resolved. This also means sketching out a temporal horizon, the point in time at which the inconsistency transforms into a consistency in order to establish the next convention, to suppress the language, to suppress it with meaning, to suppress those who should believe in the meaning of the spoken or written word. A chorus, an image of a society that polyphonically attempts to permit one voice, to gather in the one, in the promise of the shared. What is then recited has the aura of a prayer, like a mantra appealing to the text so that it may hold and codify this language. A commemoration of escape in order to escape language. A commemoration of a sermon. Spoken writing, almost destroyed, practically unheard of. Back to the beginning. Repeat the beginning, to disrupt the beginning of the text and the speech.

“As Lewis Carroll says, it is when the smile is without a cat that man can effectively become cat as soon as he smiles.”

MIRIAM BAJTALA

What do you think about the role of the chorus in the work?

CHRISTA BENZER

I like the image of the chorus quite a lot. That is firstly because I know most of the protagonists. They are performers as well as visual artists from Vienna's art scene, none of whom, as far as I know, have exhibited in the Secession. I also quite like that your exhibition, *in my name*, will remain a solo presentation, and yet I am also quite pleased that it includes a density of very confident aspirants for solo exhibitions: "I too would like to exhibit at the Secession some day," writes artist Flora Watzal, quite determined, in the speech that she wrote in your name.

Despite the confusion of the subjective positions striven for in the exhibition concept, for me, Flora Watzal—as a member of the chorus—also represents the position of those artists who articulate your (counter-) speech in the collective. "I want to be loud," is the very first line of the speech you wrote in lyric form that, spoken as a chorus, breaks the usual tranquility of the White Cube.

If you engage with the speech, the massive presence of this speaking body quickly supersedes the representative function of the architecture that, as is well known, is the pride and joy of the Secession.

Although the image of the chorus has its origin in your critique of the hierarchical spatial layout, it removes exactly those sublime characteristics of the most classic of all of Vienna's White Cubes that actually make it so desirable for artists.

Because the fifty-member chorus (which would hardly have had enough space in the Grafisches Kabinett) makes this showing in the Main Hall a necessity, this also makes me think about gender-specific exhibition practices. After all, even nowadays there remains the widely held opinion that female artists have a tendency to small-format, less "loud" works which could never be shown in such a huge space.

„you are not the little Eskimo going by, ... you do not need to mistake yourself for him. But you may perhaps put yourself in his shoes, you have something to assemble with him, an Eskimo-becoming which does not consist in playing the Eskimo, in imitating or identifying yourself with him or taking the Eskimo upon yourself, but in assembling something between you and him, for you can only become Eskimo if the Eskimo himself becomes something else.“

Ladies and gentlemen,

The "I" is sometimes Miriam Bajtala, and sometimes it isn't. The "I" is continually reaching its limits when it attempts to write from a perspective that isn't its own. This creates an over-determined image. It is an image that speaks to the audience—to you—from different standpoints simultaneously. This is because the paradigmatic "I" is a zero point in the coordinate system of subjective orientation. "Everyone can say 'I' and everyone who says it indicates a different object from everyone else; as many proper names as speakers are necessary [...]"¹ She once said that she finds some conceptual positions difficult: "Especially when everything merges in language. That is why I always try to find a correlate in the material world."

However, bringing language into form is not that simple. It isn't an easy endeavor, neither for her nor for the "I." We, as the lowest common denominator different subjects can have, are thus faced with a challenge. The reason for this is that "[i]n all language and linguistic creations there remains, in addition to what can be conveyed, something that cannot be communicated; depending on the context in which it appears, it is something that symbolises or something that is symbolised."² Having options is reassuring—whether one uses them or not. I once wrote this about her. "Creating new tools for oneself helps open more possibilities," was her answer.

"My mind is clearer when I know I have a space available in which I can work. There are projects that necessitate real space; other projects require inner space." The "here" of this speech, the fleeting moment of its phonetic articulation, contributes to the genesis of a new receptacle for narration. A vessel is created as language comes into being, a site that can be crossed in a multitude of ways and that you, as apprehending subject, attribute meaning to.

"I'm not interested in the perfect time interval, I'm interested in repetition. Time is always important to me. I became acquainted with time through sound." The "now" of our being together, ladies and gentlemen, is manifested in the transient sound of the actress's vocal apparatus and is nevertheless not unequivocally determinable because the "present [exists] only as the intersection of past and future. What we describe as a visible point isn't a point at all, but a minimal surface. No matter how we twist and turn it, through examining the use of language we arrive at the ontological statement that time in and of itself and in its dimensions of past, present, and future does not exist, is not."³

“I want to learn through my work. Either through an answer to a particular question or by way of a new question that arises from it.” She is aware of herself. She is aware of her self. But she is also aware that a “remaining sign that only references itself and is thus completely subsumed in the category of firstness [would be] an oxymoron. When a first thing references itself, this reference posits a relation and thus necessarily a second thing. Therefore the self-reference already constitutes a difference between the sign and the object that it represents.”⁴ In conclusion, the “I” only has the possibility of again falling back on something that she has already said: “I am happy that I have methodological freedom in the visual arts.” They are Miriam Bajtala, you are Miriam Bajtala, we are Miriam Bajtala, it is Miriam Bajtala, she is Miriam Bajtala, he is Miriam Bajtala, you are Miriam Bajtala, it is I: Miriam Bajtala.

Thank you for listening!

- 1 Karl Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, the authorized translation of the German original (Gustav Fischer, Jena/Stuttgart 1934/1982), John Benjamin’s Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 2011, p. 119.
- 2 Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” translated by Harry Zohn in: Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet (eds.), *Theories of translation: an anthology of essays from Dryden to Derrida*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, p. 80.
- 3 Constanze Peres, “Jetztzeit – Erlebniszeit – Kunstwerk. Was heißt es, von der Gegenwart des Kunstwerks zu sprechen?” [Present time – experiential time – artwork: what does it mean to speak of the presence of the artwork?], spoken original of a lecture as part of the *zeitraumzeit* [timespacetime] symposium, Künstlerhaus, Vienna, 17 October 2008.
- 4 Winfried Nöth and others, *Mediale Selbstreferenz: Grundlagen und Fallstudien zu Werbung, Computerspiel und den Comics*, Herbert von Halem Verlag, Cologne, 2008, p. 13.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

What does appropriation mean in this context? Recognising whom? Where is the work that promises the ego?

CLAUDIA SLANAR

I think “recognising whom” is the central question in which you open yourself and, at the same time, throws us viewers back onto ourselves. You complicate it further with this splitting of your person into several parts, the displacement of your authorship, the (supposed) surrender of control. Outsourcing and lean management are the commercial policy equivalents of these strategies. Or does this act perhaps attest to a fatigue, an unwillingness to acquiesce to this role of artist that is so often demanded of you?

But then what do we want to recognise, the work or the artist? Our wanting to see and understand is also a form of appropriation that you, as an artist, can only control to a certain extent. Because the promise of an artistic work as such always implies, at the very least, the self of the artist somewhere: in the image, from offstage, in the composition, in a gesture. With cognition, it is more about attempting to separate an artistic and a literary subject—meaning the transfer of the position of the “first-person narrator” from literature to visual art. Is that even possible? Is the whole field of art as a product-producing system potentially so characterised by the thoughts of an artist’s work’s originality and authenticity that nobody, even with complete resistance, can really escape it? It’s a rhetorical question. Hence what is more pertinent is: how to deal with authenticity? And it seems to me at the moment as if there were an earnestness, a seriousness that has nothing to do with sober-mindedness. Perhaps this is the “antitoxin” to the postmodern dictatorship of irony of the past decade?

However, although it’s perhaps a bit far off the point, Argentinian author Jorge Luis Borges also comes to mind, whose work

is so informed by the entangling and interweaving of the first-person narrator and author. He appropriates his own work, for instance, through critiques of and commentaries about imaginary books. “Life itself is a quotation,” says he who weaves the mesh of fiction so tightly that when he, as “author,” writes a foreword or epilogue to explain his short stories he succeeds only in getting more entangled still. In this respect, I want to regard your work as somewhat the style of Borges: not as a surreal parable, but rather more as an elliptic tale about the author’s alleged search for her work. There are also equivalents to Borges’s temporal distortions, to humour, and to melancholy.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

My speech is spoken by others. In the installation across the space, I can be seen in the roles of the four speechwriters. By way of my exterior surfaces—facial expression, gestures, clothing style—they are polished and interpreted. The two videos are synchronised in the exhibition in such a way that they never run in parallel. What do you associate with the presentation form in the exhibition?

CHRISTA BENZER

I can't say much about the "positioning" in its finished form at the moment. However, what I do like is that you went far beyond the mere appropriation of the Main Hall in the exhibition's development. The aspect of institutional criticism is thus virtually picked up in passing, but not made the main message. What I experience through the contrast of the "staged" speeches is rather a poetic reflection about the making of exhibitions. I think that you did a very good job of breaking with the assumption that artists "give birth" to the contents all alone. On the one hand, there is the chorus, which refers to your social and artistic context in its composition, and, on the other, there are the four selected people you've commissioned for the speeches. With their expectations and projections from four different perspectives, they introduce essential contents about the artist as subject, the artwork, and art production, to which you also react in your (counter-) speech. By leaving the chorus to perform your "opinion" while you yourself speak the four ghost-writer speeches, both appropriation and translation processes are also addressed. Ultimately, voids and disruptions on both sides allow for the conjecture that this has to do with a performing engagement with the representative functions of speech, voice, or of "facial expression, gestures, clothing style" as you write in the question yourself.

SARAH KOLB

There is a psychotherapeutic method that attempts to achieve successful dialogue by having a person's counterpart repeat, word for word, what the other just said before speaking herself. Even if this method doesn't work miracles, it does promise to avoid one thing: that the one person, like the other, only sees a running film that both have long since grown tired of and through which, to make matters even worse, each instrumentalises the other as a projection surface for her own feelings. Negation is not the only viable approach to taking a stand: those who want to hear must feel.

ANDREAS SPIEGL

I think the shifts between the so-called Main Hall and the Grafisches Kabinett work wonderfully; thus you transform them both into imaginary spaces. One is neither here nor there and yet in both simultaneously.

GABRIELE MACKERT

I believe I will direct my attention to both by turns. It's wonderful how the empty Main Hall becomes an echo chamber through the chorus of your speakers. The reverberation seems monstrous due to its diffusivity. Almost the only way the speech can be understood is by way of the displayed texts. For this, you use white text on a black stripe above the center of the image. Like a (foreign-language) opera, you thus insist on the content of your speech, which you scatter about the room, assigning it to fifty people. The speech rumbles before the chorus rises and words form. Through the echo, the speaking measures the location of your desires.

In Greek mythology, Echo was a mountain nymph who, on Zeus's instructions, entertained Zeus's wife Hera by telling stories so that Zeus had time for amorous adventures. When Hera discovered this, she

punished Echo by taking away her voice and leaving her only the ability to repeat the words of others. This is why Echo could not admit her love to Narcissus...

MIRIAM BAJTALA

I selected the interview format for the text contribution in the catalogue and invite writers to take a position on my questions. Why are you cooperating?

DIETMAR SCHWÄRZLER

"Jäcki doesn't take interviews very seriously. Newsreel—last page. One knows what one wants to ask, usually one also knows the answers and which answers one never gets. Jäcki would most prefer to ask everyone what they do in bed. But of course one cannot do that. Le Corbusier, Che Guevara, Michel Ladiges. Everything else is just always the same thing and uninteresting. One comes up with the questions between tea and papaya. One needs a half an hour for an interview. One can also omit the questions."*

*From: Hubert Fichte, *Die Geschichte der Empfindlichkeit*, Volume VII: *Explosion. Roman der Ethnologie*, Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1993.

... but the one only becomes the other if the other becomes something yet other, and if the terms disappear."

MIRIAM BAJTALA

You are familiar with my latest film work, *3 Stimmen* [3 voices]. Do you see parallels to the new work, *in my name*, for instance in how text, speech, voice are dealt with?

DIETMAR SCHWÄRZLER

Of course I see parallels between *3 Stimmen* and *in my name*, especially concerning the translation mechanisms that I don't want to describe in more detail here. Instead, I'm interested in the respective roles that you take up, because in both works, similar to a conductor, you are operating in a profession that is mainly associated with men. In *3 Stimmen*, it is just one, namely your text, that you yourself put into the mouths of a male and female performer in Slovakian, English, and German, and you also present the text to a certain extent and assembled its elements. You remain offstage with your own voice in your so-called mother tongue and don't enter the frame, which strengthens your position, because being in the frame can often be problematic. I see the situation as somewhat more difficult in *in my name* since the structure, at least at first glance, seems more open because it is transferred to the Others. If I may develop the image of a conductor a little further, however, this method of working also contains "wrong notes," which occur at moments when you don't get what you actually hoped for, for instance in a speech that

doesn't meet your expectations, or when a chorus suddenly acts much too rigidly for you and makes your job as the conductor seem suspicious to you. You naturally strive to react to these false notes, but in this position you are walking a very fine line between permission and denial, which complicates the composition. This is also transferable to this interview form: you provided me with extensive information about the project in the run-up to it, only to then leave me to my own devices—and I cannot entirely shake off the feeling that I am not really free because I must comply with a particular way of reading and expectation that you ascribe to my person as filmmaker or curator. There is probably also a certain curiosity involved. Normally, one wants to find out something about the person or work of the counterpart in an interview. You turn it around, however, because you want to find out something about yourself or your work in a framework you staked out. Which brings us back to conducting again.

MIRIAM BAJTALA

How do you deal with quotes?

MIRIAM BAJTALA

What else would you write about *in my name*?

CHRISTIAN HÖLLER

It has been widely known for quite some time that the self is split many times over, even in the mentally "healthiest" people. Psychoanalysis à la Lacan, as it is taken seriously, asserts nothing more than that the desiring and speaking subject is permeated by any number of schisms. In *The Divided Self* (1960), Ronald Laing went so far as to consider the self (not just in the case of schizophrenics) as reciprocal, multiply intersecting functions between self-perception and the perception of others. Deleuze and Guattari ultimately asserted that a "desiring-machine" branches out through all of world history and is not trapped in the father-mother-child triad.

Why am I mentioning all this? Because even after fifty years in which all of it has been emphatically demonstrated, the artistic self is still assumed to be autonomous, self-governed, and insular. To speak in "one's own name" seems, in contrast, more difficult, even *more impossible* than a subject critique gone ornamental may admit or allow. The paradoxical experiment of trusting someone else to speak in your first person, or conversely, to again adapt your own speech, cannot be valued too highly. And thus it is still astounding when an irreducible babble of voices rises in the chorus, that is to say: the inescapable divided self finds its polyphonic expression.

All citation snippets are from:

Gilles Deleuze / Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007.
 p. 38: *ibid.*, p. 1.
 p. 39, 44: *ibid.*, p. 53.
 p. 40: *ibid.*, p. 52.
 p. 43, 49: *ibid.*, p. 73.
 p. 51: *ibid.*, p. 78.

„you haven't got hold of the unconscious, you never get hold of it, it is not an 'it was' in place of which the Ψ must come. (...) You have to produce the unconscious. It is not at all a matter of repressed memories or even of phantasms. You don't reproduce childhood memories, you produce blocs of child-becoming with blocs of childhood which are always in the present. A man manufactures or assembles [agence], not with the egg from which he emerged, nor with the progenitors who attach him to it (...) but with the scrap of placenta which he has hidden, and which is always contemporary with him, as raw material to experiment with. Produce some unconscious, ...“